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Executive Summary
We collected data on health plan choices and retirement savings deci-
sions by employees from a large employer with just under a 16,000-
person workforce that offered traditional health plans and a health sav-
ings account (HSA) in 2006. We also recorded employees’ retirement
contributions for the current and prior years along with their health plan
choices. We examine (a) whether employees make joint choices for a tra-
ditional health plan versus an HSA and participation in an optional re-
tirement plan, and (b) conditional on participation, the amount of the
employee’s contribution to the optional plan. Using health insurance
claims and other human resources data to create control variables of in-
come, job type, age, gender, number of dependents, and health status of
the household, we ﬁnd that those who elected a HSA were more likely
to participate in a retirement savings account, and once invested, we
ﬁnd weak evidence that HSA policyholders are more likely to supple-
ment retirement assets. When we account for strong prior preferences
for savings behavior we cannot reject the null hypothesis that investing
in HSAs does not affect retirement investing. More analysis from other
employers with more signiﬁcant HSAtake-up is required to support the
conclusions of this analysis.
3.1 Introduction
Congress enacted and the President signed into law the Medicare Pre-
scription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA).
The MMA establishes Health Savings Accounts (HSAs), which are tax-
advantaged savings vehicles that can be used to pay for medical ex-
penses incurred by individuals and their dependents. Unused balancesin HSAs can accumulate over a lifetime and at retirement age they can
be converted into retirement savings. Early withdrawals for non-
healthcare uses have penalties similar to early withdrawals from 
tax-advantaged retirement accounts.
HSAs are being sold by ﬁnancial services companies as part of a
health and wealth savings package. For example, Fidelity Investments
sells a combination of a HSA and personal retirement saving account.1
The HSA account is coupled with a high deductible health plan
(HDHP). Fidelity and other ﬁrms also have calculated the amount of a
one-time investor-age dependent contribution to cover future medical
expenses, as well as provide additional ﬁnancial assets from long term
investments using the HSA asset as the starting investment.
In this chapter we develop a theory of the relationship between health
and retirement savings choices, and test the theory using data from a
large regional employer to identify whether there is a relationship be-
tween HSA election and retirement investment decisions. We posit that
these choices will be conditional on prior personal states—including in-
come, previous contributions, previous health history, and demograph-
ics such as age and the number of dependents.
We examine two research questions:
• Is HSA choice related to retirement investment decisions?
• If HSA choice is related to retirement investment decisions, do con-
sumers make rational retirement portfolio decisions?
We begin with a description of our earlier work on the factors affect-
ing employees’ choices of consumer driven health plans (CDHPs), in-
cluding HSAs. We then outline the conceptual model to be tested with a
new employer database of HSA and retirement investment decisions.
Empirical results are discussed in the context of the policy development
of tax-advantaged health plans as a vehicle for increased long term ﬁ-
nancial planning as well as a personal health investment.
3.2 Earlier Findings
The HSAs resulting from the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 were
the product of two separate evolutionary paths. The ﬁrst was the devel-
opment of the Medical Savings Account in the early 1990s as advocated
by economists, policy makers, and insurance executives who wanted an
alternative healthcare reimbursement mechanism to traditional fee-for-
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through the 1980s. Their concern was that low thresholds for ﬁrst-dollar
coverage invited moral hazard and created an upward pressure on
medical care insurance premiums over time. As managed care plans
evolved in the 1980s, low co payments at the point of purchase divorced
from the consumers’ knowledge any representation of the actual price
of medical care—leading some to argue that managed care simply com-
pounded the problems presented by ﬁrst-dollar coverage. An alterna-
tive form of insurance called the medical savings account (MSA) was de-
veloped in the mid-1990s. MSAs were introduced as tax-advantaged
health plans in the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act (HIPAA), but were only available to a limited set of the popula-
tion, most notably senior citizens, individuals, and employers with less
than 75 employees.
On a parallel and later development track, new health insurance ven-
tures were inspired by the surge of e-commerce in the late 1990s. Several
new plans were developed within months of each other and were
funded with venture capital. Deﬁnity Health, started in 2000, repre-
sented the deﬁned contribution approach to health beneﬁts. The name of
the ﬁrm drew reference to the concept of a 401K retirement model ap-
plied to health care. Deﬁnity Health and another ﬁrm, Lumenos, man-
aged to generate substantial growth in membership by capitalizing on
the Employer Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) policy ve-
hicle to offer employers a highly customized self-insured health beneﬁt
design. The early deﬁned contribution health plans were almost identi-
cal to MSAs except that they required no federal guidelines for opera-
tion and were largely exempt from state insurance commission over-
sight and approval. By the eve of MMA in 2003, deﬁned contribution
health plans had gained several hundred thousand members in the pe-
riod of just two years.
The last piece of development was the consumer driven health plan
(CDHP). In the spring of 2001, the leaders of the insurance ventures held
a public conference in Chicago where they all agreed to use the term
CDHP to distinguish their products as an innovation designed to en-
gage consumers with information on price and quality to enable better
health plan choices. Most of the leaders knew that sufﬁcient data on
price and quality of medical care were not yet available, but their intent
was to build CDHPs ﬁrst. If consumers had incentives to use the data
currently available, they thought that more higher quality data would
be created as the business model evolved.
Do HSA Choices Interact with Retirement Savings Decisions? 83At the federal level, a new health plan design called health reimburse-
ment arrangements (HRAs) was approved by the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice in 2002. As long as the reimbursement account was funded solely
by the employer, employees could use tax-free employer contributions
to pay for approved medical expenses. The accounts could be carried
over to later years, allowing employees and former employees—in-
cluding retirees—continued access to unused reimbursements. How-
ever, the accounts were not owned by the employee and employers were
not obligated to extend coverage to former employees and retirees.
Hence, the accounts remained an asset of the employer, not the indi-
vidual.
HSAs were the product of prior, but limited, development of MSAs
and the substantial success of CDHPs in a relatively short span of time.
The 2003 legislation made HSAs available to anyone under the age of
sixty-ﬁve. Unlike an HRA, the HSA account is owned by the employee
as an asset with the same early withdrawal penalties as a retirement ac-
count, unless the money is used for medical care. Today, there are an es-
timated ﬁve million HSA subscribers and three million HRA holders
(AIS 2007). While still a minority of health plan enrollment, CDHP
growth has been rapid—particularly for HSAs in the individual and
small group markets.
We have found the appeal of HSAs to be national. In one large ﬁrm
with employees in over forty states, the adoption of HSAs was not iso-
lated to any one geographic location. As seen in ﬁgure 3.1, adoption has
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Figure 3.1
One large employer. HSA take-up 2006been greatest in the West and South Atlantic states. This is somewhat
surprising given the dominance of managed care plans in California,
but in the case of this employer and others, a previously offered HRA
plan was quite popular too—suggesting a preference for CDHP plans.
One of the major attributes of HSAs is consumer ownership of the tax-
advantaged spending account. Beyond consumer ownership there are
ﬁve other key features. First, the unused assets in the HSA roll over at
year-end to the next year. This is in contrast to currently tax-advantaged
ﬂexible spending accounts (FSAs), which do not roll over. These are of-
ten associated as use it or lose it beneﬁts. Second, the HSA must be pur-
chased along with a high deductible health insurance policy. But, the ac-
count does not need to be funded at all. In fact, well over half the
accounts are unfunded or minimally so—suggesting that the plans are
merely a more complicated form of high deductible health insurance
with an option to invest for later. Third, these plans can be purchased by
consumers in state-regulated individual or small group markets. The
early CDHPs (HRAs) were usually offered by ERISA-exempt self-
insured employers and were outside the jurisdiction of state insurance
regulation. Fourth, to limit the tax-deductible exposure of HSA assets,
the annual investment is generally limited to the lesser of the insurance
deductible or a maximum amount ﬁxed by the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment. This has given the Treasury Department a much greater role in the
regulation of a health insurance product. Fifth, individuals over age
sixty-ﬁve may withdraw money from their HSAto pay Medicare Part A,
Part B, or HMO premiums. Money withdrawn early for premiums or
nonmedical expenses will be considered taxable income and will be sub-
ject to a 10 percent penalty, similar to early withdrawals from tax-
advantaged retirement accounts.
Our prior research has examined the impact of CDHPs on health plan
choice and health care cost and utilization. The ﬁrst question we ad-
dressed was, “Who chooses a CDHP?” We worked with human re-
sources personnel to obtain two years of survey data and health plan
claims data from the University of Minnesota, in order to identify a set
of demographic factors affecting plan choice. We found that CDHP en-
rollees had signiﬁcantly higher incomes than those who chose tradi-
tional health insurance plans. There was no statistically signiﬁcant dif-
ference in the health status of employees who chose the CDHP and those
who chose other health plan designs. If anything, we found the most fa-
vorable selection was in the University’s HMO plan (Parente, Feldman,
and Christianson 2004).
Do HSA Choices Interact with Retirement Savings Decisions? 85A concurrent analysis on the affects of a CDHP on medical care ex-
penditures and utilization focused on another large employer in the
manufacturing sector. Here, we found that a cohort of enrollees in the
CDHP had lower health care costs than those in a preferred provider or-
ganization (PPO) in the second year of enrollment, but higher costs than
a point of service (POS) plan (Parente, Feldman, and Christianson 2004).
Afollow-up analysis looking at an additional year of data found that the
CDHP had become the most expensive plan by end of the third year
(Feldman, Parente, and Christianson 2007). All of these results were
based on tracking a cohort of employees for up to four years.
For this employer, we found initial favorable selection into the CDHP,
but that quickly changed in subsequent periods as the group became
more intense in their service use. One of the explanations for the signif-
icant upward trend in CDHP expenditures was the very generous
health beneﬁt design offered. For example, the dominant CDHP plan for
families provided a two thousand dollar account associated with a three
thousand dollar deductible and zero percent coinsurance rate after
reaching the deductible—leaving only one thousand dollars of out-of-
pocket expenses for a beneﬁt that typically has an insurance premium of
nine thousand dollars. Furthermore, the employee could opt to pay the
one thousand dollar gap with a ﬂexible spending account (FSA), which
would reduce the ﬁnancial cost by the employee’s marginal tax rate,
times the spending from the FSA. Subsequent to our analysis, the em-
ployer changed the beneﬁt design and offered a less generous CDHP
with a larger deductible and 15 percent coinsurance.
Our most recent work on health plan choice focused on a third em-
ployer with over one-hundred-ﬁfty thousand covered lives and em-
ployees operating in over forty states (Parente, Feldman and Christian-
son 2007). This employer offered an HRAand an HSAas well as, at least,
four other insurance products as concurrent choices. We recently exam-
ined data on 2006 choices and found little evidence of adverse selection
if we consider both the HRA and HSA as a combined CDHP nest com-
prising similar plans. However, when we examined all types of plan
choice we found substantial unfavorable selection to the HRA and very
favorable selection to the HSA. The addition of both types of CDHPs, as
sanctioned by the 2003 MMA, split the risk preferences of the employee
population. We also found very similar results to our earlier work with
respect to higher-income employees choosing CDHPs. This is the ﬁrst
economic analysis of HSAchoice in an employer, and it suggests the in-
86 Parente and Feldmancentives of these plans are sensitive enough to create a signiﬁcant
change in behavior. It should be noted that the HSAand HRAoffered by
the sample employer used the same account and deductible design. The
only difference was whether the account was owned by the employee or
was a notional account held by the employer on the employee’s behalf.
3.3 Conceptual Model
We develop a conceptual model to examine the relationship between
HSAchoice and retirement investments. Based on our previous ﬁndings
that consumers are aware of and act on changes in health beneﬁt design,
it is especially interesting to examine their joint health and wealth deci-
sions. The model focuses on the consumers’decisions to take risk. It also
assumes the market asset is not tax-sheltered. The model applies best to
a person who has maxed-out her tax-sheltered retirement contribution.
Unfortunately, we can not fully test the model with our data because we
lack information on the types of assets that employees choose for their
HSA and retirement investments. The scenario we attempt to test is
theHSAand retirement participation choices of employees from a large
employer. A full exposition of the model, starting with the concept of
Sharpe’s risk-averse investor, is presented in Appendix A.
Applying the model to HSA and supplemental retirement decisions,
we focus on employees working in ﬁrms providing education, health
care and the arts, who are eligible to contribute to a 403(b) supplemen-
tal retirement savings plan. Furthermore, since 1978 employees also are
able to contribute to Section 457 retirement savings plans. Both of these
are tax-deferred retirement savings programs. Unused, HSAs are yet
another form of tax-deferred retirement savings program.2
We assume there is a subset of employees who are maximum savers.
They wish to take full or signiﬁcant advantage of all tax-deferred sav-
ings opportunities. Assume an employee of this type has already
maxed-out her 403(b)3 contribution. When an HSA option becomes
available, she chooses it, while maintaining her 403(b). Addition of the
HSA option allows the person to increase her tax-free savings without
reducing her 403(b) contributions. Presumably, this person can also add
to her total savings by maxing out both her 403(b) and 457 opportunities.
Imagine another person who has not maxed-out her 403(b). She might
still choose an HSA if she were very healthy because of the employer
contribution to the account. It has a good return and a low risk because
Do HSA Choices Interact with Retirement Savings Decisions? 87she does not expect to spend much on out-of-pocket medical care. In this
case, we would expect to see some cutback in the 403(b) contribution be-
cause the HSA is a better vehicle for tax-free savings.
In both of these scenarios, it is reasonable to expect someone to invest
in an HSA as a supplemental retirement opportunity. An interesting
question is whether the person who does not typically max out their
403(b) contribution, but chooses an HSA, operates as if she faces a bud-
get constraint for retirement allocations and shifts resources from her




To complete this analysis, we collected data on health plan choices and
retirement savings decisions of employees from a University employer
that offered traditional health plans and an HSA in the 2005 open en-
rollment period for the 2006 beneﬁt year. We also recorded employees’
403(b) and 457 retirement contributions for the current (2006) and prior
(2005) years. A 403(b) plan is a retirement plan for University, civil gov-
ernment, and not-for-proﬁt employees. It has the same characteristics
and beneﬁts as a 401(k). A 457 plan is a non qualiﬁed tax-deferred com-
pensation plan that is similar to a 401(k) and a 403(b) plan. Speciﬁcally,
we abstract the annual contribution by the employee.
All faculty members at the University participate in a mandatory
401(a) deﬁned contribution retirement program where they must con-
tribute 2.5 percent of their salary, which the University matches with 13
percent of the salary. Civil Service and nonfaculty bargaining unit em-
ployees are covered by a deﬁned-beneﬁt retirement program with
mandatory employee contributions of 4 percent of total salary, matched
by employer contributions of 4 percent of total salary. All employees are
eligible to participate in the optional retirement plans. In 2005 and 2006,
the maximum 403(b) contributions permitted were eighteen thousand
dollars and twenty thousand dollars respectively. Likewise, the maxi-
mum 457 contributions in 2005 and 2006 were fourteen thousand dollars
and ﬁfteen thousand dollars. Thus, in 2006 an employee could opt for a
maximum supplemental retirement contribution of thirty-ﬁve thou-
sand dollars.
The employer’s available health plans are presented in table 3.1. The


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eemployer pays a ﬁxed contribution by type of coverage: single, two-
person, single with child, and family. Variation in premiums to the em-
ployee is dependent on the different types of health plans offered and
the employee’s marginal tax rate. The University offers a preferred
provider organization (PPO) health plan with a large provider panel,
less cost sharing, and a higher employee cost than the point of service
(POS) plan. The University also offers an exclusive provider organiza-
tion (EPO) with a smaller provider panel then the PPO. The health sav-
ings account (HSA) offered in 2006 provided a cash deposit into a bank
account designated for medical expenses. For an employee, ﬁve hun-
dred dollars is deposited. For a family contract, one thousand dollars is
deposited. Unlike a ﬂexible spending account, funds in the HSA do not
have to be spent by the end of a calendar year. And in contrast to a health
reimbursement account, which is not portable and to which only the em-
ployer may contribute, the HSAis fully portable as speciﬁed by the IRS.
In addition, the employee can contribute up to two thousand dollars
(pretax) to the account for single policies and four thousand dollars (pre-
tax) to the account for family coverage. The single-contract HSA de-
ductible is two thousand ﬁve hundred dollars and the family-contract
HSA deductible is ﬁve thousand dollars. For all plans but the HMO, 10
percent coinsurance applies to in-network services. Preventive care is
covered at 100 percent in all plans.
The variables available for our analysis are presented in table 3.2. The
data are derived principally from human resources data extracts from
the employer for years 2005 and 2006. In addition, we used claims data
from a previous analysis of consumer directed health plans (CDHPs) to
identify the presence of chronic illness in the study population as a
dummy variable. The chronic illness variable is based on the identiﬁca-
tion of the chronic illness groups from the Johns Hopkins Ambulatory
Diagnostic Group (ADG) system (Weiner, Starﬁeld, Steinwachs, and
Mumford 1991). Previous descriptions of our application of the ADG
system are detailed in Parente, Feldman and Christianson (2004).
Using the employer’s health plan information and our previous algo-
rithm for measuring pre-tax premiums, we identiﬁed a premium mea-
sure for HSAs and other health plans. For simplicity, we used a
weighted average of other health plan premiums based on contract type
and prevalence of take-up in the other plans. From the human resources
data, we abstracted employee age, gender, salary, years at the employer,
number of dependents, and insurance contract type. We also identiﬁed
a variable—professional job class—to account for possible social net-
90 Parente and Feldmanworking regarding health beneﬁt decisions. This job class includes ad-
ministrators, physicians, professors, and research scientists. The em-
ployees not classiﬁed include clerical workers, maintenance personnel,
organized labor ﬁelds, and food services. Using pooled data on 403(b)
and 457 contributions, we were able to identify the prevalence of sup-
plemental retirement investment contributions and the amount in-
vested annually. In addition, we identiﬁed a group—max savers—who
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Table 3.2 
Variable Names and Descriptive Statistics
2005–2006
Employee Panel 2006 Employee Sample
Sample Standard Sample Standard
Varia Description Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
Plan Choices of Employees in 2006 N   15,964 N   13,217
In Health Savings Account in 2006   1, else   0 0.004 0.063 0.004 0.063
Optional Retirement Savings in 2005 and 2006
2005 opt in to supplemental retirement 
program (403B or 457)   1, else   0 0.319 0.063
2006 opt in to supplemental retirement 
program (403B or 457)   1, else   0 0.301 0.459 0.334 0.466
2005 Amount invested in supplemental 
retirement program ($) 2,432.89 5678.620
2006 Amount invested in supplemental 
retirement program ($) 2,496.49 6.106.95 2,768.14 6359.250
Employee investing at 90th percentile of 2005 
supplemental program   1, else   0 0.035 0.183
Employee investing at 90th percentile of 2006 
supplemental program   1, else   0 0.033 0.178 0.036 0.187
Employee Chararacteristics
Employee’s tax-adjusted medical insurance 
annual premium ($) 852.28 517.52 1,255.30 775.319
Employee or immediate family member has 
chronic condition   1, else   0 0.164 0.37 0.187 0.390
Employee elected a single contract   1, 
family   0 0.477 0.50 0.455 0.498
Number of dependents 1.085 1.32 1.132 1.326
Employee’s salary minus tax liabilities ($) 49,669.60 36908.11 53,334.03 37291.690
Employee is female   1, male   0 0.535 0.50 0.532 0.499
Employee age in 2006 44.48 11.759 45.92 11.276
Years at employer in 2006 11.37 10.076 11.82 9.974
Professional job class   1, else   0 0.648 0.478 0.636 0.481had retirement investment at the 90th and above percentile of the al-
lowed contribution, conditional on investing.
We describe two populations in table 3.2. The ﬁrst is the population
who could select an HSAin 2006. The second is the population who was
employed in both 2005 and 2006. The second set of data provides a com-
parison of the 2005 and 2006 supplemental retirement contributions.
Of special note is the very small take-up of the HSA plan, with only
sixty-three employees—or 0.4 percent of the approximately sixteen
thousand employee population—selecting this plan. The health reim-
bursement account had less than two hundred employee take-up. This
is surprising given that the 2005 enrollment in CDHPs for this employer
was over one thousand three hundred. The combination of a less gener-
ous beneﬁt design for both the HRA and HSA between 2005 and 2006
and an increase in premiums relative to other plans likely had an impact.
When we designed our natural experiment with this employer, we did
not expect such a low take-up. As such, we proceeded with our empiri-
cal analysis with caution and we are alert to future employer data op-
portunities.
3.4.2 Methods
We estimate a bivariate probit model of two concurrent employee deci-
sions: (1) election of an HSAhealth plan, and (2) the decision to enroll in
a supplemental retirement policy. The speciﬁcation of the bivariate pro-
bit permits us to see the different effects of employee characteristics as
well as the relatedness of these decisions. This bivariate probit speciﬁ-
cation estimates the effect of employee characteristics on the joint deter-
mination of HSA and optional retirement program participation.4
We also used a generalized linear regression model (GLM) to test
what factors were associated with the contribution to the supplemental
retirement program. For this part of the analysis we use a difference-in-
differences approach comparing the impact of pre- and post-HSAintro-
duction on retirement saving. These investment regressions account for
repeated observations on individuals, and tests of statistical signiﬁcance
are on based robust standard errors.
We completed this analysis using two different approaches. First we
examined the impact of an HSAcohort variable (plus a time interaction)
on supplemental retirement investment. Second, we added the max
saver variable and fully inter-acted it with time and the HSA cohort to
see if there was any evidence of the behavior suggested in ﬁgure 3A.3.
92 Parente and Feldman3.5 Results
The results of the empirical analyses are presented in tables 3.3, 3.4, and
3.5. First, table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics for the HSA and
non-HSA populations to see differences in personal attributes and re-
tirement savings. Table 3.4 provides the results of a bivariate probit
model to test whether there is a relationship between HSA investment
and supplemental retirement contributions. Table 3.5 presents the
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Table 3.3 
Variable Names and Descriptive Statistics—HSA versus non-HSA Cohorts
2006 HSA Population 2006 Non-HSA Population
Sample Standard Sample Standard
Varia Description Mean Deviation Mean Deviation T-test
Optional Retirement Savings in 2005 and 2006 N   52 N   13,164
2005 opt in to supplemental retirement 
program (403B or 457)   1, else   0 0.547 0.500 0.318 0.466
∗∗∗
2006 opt in to supplemental retirement 
program (403B or 457)   1, else   0 0.509 0.502 0.333 0.471
∗∗∗
2005 Amount invested in supplemental 
retirement program ($) 6,413.41 9420.790 2,416.86 5653.190
∗∗∗
2006 Amount invested in supplemental 
retirement program ($) 6,753.67 10530.270 2,752.10 6332.170
∗∗∗
Employee investing at 90th percentile of 
2005 supplemental program   1, else   0 0.132 0.340 0.034 0.182
∗∗∗
Employee investing at 90th percentile of 
2006 supplemental program   1, else   0 0.132 0.340 0.036 0.186
∗∗∗
Employee Chararacteristics
Employee’s tax-adjusted medical insurance 
annual premium ($) 682.91 426.708 865.90 516.959
∗∗∗
Employee or immediate family member has 
chronic condition   1, else   0 0.113 0.318 0.187 0.390
∗
Employee elected a single contract   1, 
family   0 0.547 0.500 0.455 0.498
Number of dependents 0.811 1.139 1.133 1.326
∗
Employee’s salary minus tax liabilities ($) 75,802.58 53751.620 53,243.57 37184.740
∗∗∗
Employee is female   1, male   0 0.472 0.502 0.533 0.499
Employee age in 2006 47.04 10.857 45.92 11.277
Years at Employer in 2006 10.68 9.250 11.82 9.976
Professional job class   1, else   0 0.849 0.360 0.635 0.481
∗∗∗
Note: Statistical Signiﬁcance
∗∗∗p   .001, 
∗∗p   .01, 
∗p   .05































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2results of the difference-in-differences analysis on the factors affecting
the level of the supplemental retirement contribution.
In table 3.3, we split the second set of data presented in table 3.2 into
the HSAand non-HSApopulations based on who chose an HSAin 2006.
HSA takers were more likely to opt into supplemental retirement pro-
grams and placed greater investment in the programs. HSAtakers were
also more likely to be max savers than those who chose other health
plans. Even with a relatively small HSAtake-up, the differences are sig-
niﬁcant using either pooled or unequal variance T-tests. With respect to
employee attributes, there were signiﬁcant differences in chronic illness
(less for HSA population), age (older for HSA), gender (fewer females
chose HSAs), income (higher salaried workers chose HSAs), family size
(larger families chose HSAs) and professional job class (more chose
HSAs).
These results are fairly consistent with our earlier analysis of CDHPs
of this employer using 2002 and 2003 data (Parente, Feldman and Chris-
tianson 2004; Parente, Christianson, and Feldman 2007). The most strik-
ing ﬁnding still remains that those with higher incomes prefer the HSA.
Interestingly, older employees prefer the HSA. However, those with
more chronic illness burden do not select the HSA.
The results of the bivariate probit model for HSA election and sup-
plemental retirement decisions for 2006 are presented in table 3.4. Each
dependent variable has its own set of coefﬁcients. The coefﬁcient rho
shows that there are common unmeasured factors that inﬂuence the
HSAand retirement choices. This coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant indicating the
presence of a joint relationship between HSAand retirement investment
decisions.
Looking at the coefﬁcients for the plan choice model, the effect of pre-
mium is negative as expected—since this can be viewed as a reduced-
form version of the health plan demand function. Other signiﬁcant and
positive effects on the decision to select an HSA are income, number of
dependents, and whether the employee has a professional job class. Age
and chronic illness are signiﬁcant predictors of choice, but the HSAtake-
up is too limited to make any strong statements. Gender and chronic ill-
ness are negatively associated with HSA choice, while age has positive
effect on HSA choice.
The employee characteristics with signiﬁcant positive effects on the
election of a supplemental retirement contribution are chronic illness,
income, female gender, age, years on the job, and professional job class.
The only negative effect, although insigniﬁcant, is whether the em-
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In our conceptual model, we predicted that HSA and investment de-
cisions would likely be related. However, the model does not inform us
on the direction of variables like chronic illness, gender, and family size.
One might assume that chronic illness would have a negative effect if
the employee presumed she might not live long enough to fully appre-
ciate her retirement savings. It makes sense for females to invest more
than males if the employee recognizes that, on average, she will need
more retirement resources since women live longer than men in the
United States.
The results of two difference-in-differences models of the factors af-
fecting supplemental retirement contributions are presented in table 3.5.
The ﬁrst model does not include the employee designation of max saver
and its interactions, whereas the second model does. From the ﬁrst
model, however, we ﬁnd that those who chose an HSA in 2006 categor-
ically invest more in retirement savings. In this ﬁrst model, the year-
speciﬁc interaction with the HSA cohort is positive but insigniﬁcant.
However, when we include the max saver variable in the second model,
the signiﬁcance of the HSA cohort variable no longer remains. Also in
the second model, the max saver attribute is quite positively related
to the retirement contribution. The interaction variables with max
savers are all positive but insigniﬁcant. The one negative, but insigniﬁ-
cant, result is the HSA and year 2006 interaction variable. This result
suggests that those who chose an HSA in 2006 reduced their supple-
mental retirement contribution in 2006 by 278 dollars compared with
2005. These results suggest that HSAplan choice is related to retirement
investment decisions but it is not a very strong effect. It is likely that the
HSA cohort attribute is highly correlated with the max saver cohort at-
tribute and that the HSA attribute is the weaker of the two with respect
to investment decisions.
Other employee attributes have similar effects in the two models.
Age, income, and professional class are associated with larger invest-
ment decisions. Interestingly, females invest less than males, but from
table 3.4 we know they are more likely to invest. Another interesting re-
sult is years at work, which is negative in both models and signiﬁcant in
the ﬁrst model. This result suggests that those with more years invested
at the University, with a very generous retirement package, are less in-
clined to invest more as their tenure increases.
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There are three new ﬁndings from our empirical analysis. First, we ﬁnd
a positive relationship between those choosing HSAs as a health plan
and those choosing to increase their retirement investment assets. We
also ﬁnd evidence that these are joint decisions from our bivariate pro-
bit results. Our second ﬁnding is that the level of investment savings
may have been positively inﬂuenced by the introduction of HSAs.
Speciﬁcally, it appears that HSAs do not crowd out retirement invest-
ment but, instead, may serve a complementary role. However, only one
of the difference-in-differences models supports this conclusion. Agen-
eral concern voiced by policy-makers and in editorial pages is that HSAs
would be used a tax shelter for the rich. While our results do not provide
a convincing afﬁrmation of this suggestion, the ﬁndings are more likely
to conﬁrm rather than reject this supposition. However, this is early
work based on very low take-up of the HSA.
Finally, the very low HSA take-up is also a new ﬁnding, but one that
we are discovering in several other employers engaged in the research
project. One explanation for the low take-up of the HSA plan—from a
purely investment standpoint—is that the employer already provided
very generous retirement beneﬁts to all its employees with a contribu-
tion of 13 percent of annual wage income for faculty and a deﬁned ben-
eﬁt plan for nonfaculty. Secondly, health plan premiums at this em-
ployer are heavily subsidized (on average over 85 percent) and the
difference between the HSA premium and the very generous PPO pre-
mium is relatively small compared with commercially available insur-
ance. The percentage difference at this employer is less than half that of
commercial insurance carriers. To be competitive, the HSA premium at
the employer should be about 55 percent less than its current amount,
given the deductible, coinsurance, and out of pocket maximum.
Our ﬁndings contribute to a broader and substantially advanced lit-
erature on individual incentives for retirement. They appear to be in line
with recent research in this area. For example, we ﬁnd a large positive
effect of salary on the decision to invest and the level of supplemental re-
tirement investment. Dyan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004) use three sources
of data to model whether the rich invest more. They also ﬁnd a positive
relationship between savings and income (though they examined life-
time income) and a weaker positive relationship between the propensity
to save and income. If HSAs are seen as another investment vehicle—
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that we see the same positive propensity to enroll in HSAs as we do with
the election of supplemental retirement associated with wage income.
We were unable to observe the effect of lifetime income due to limita-
tions in our data.
Goldman and Maestas (2005) look at a related question: whether in-
creases in risks of higher medical expenses lead to a reduction in expo-
sure to other risks among Medicare beneﬁciaries choosing between dif-
ferent supplemental insurance policies. While not explicitly examining
multi year changes in ﬁnancial investment decisions compared with
health plan decisions, the authors do ﬁnd evidence that consumers’de-
cisions reﬂect an active assessment of the trade-offs between different
types of risky assets and medical risk.
This chapter has two signiﬁcant limitations. First, the take-up of HSAs
in the employee population is very small. We ﬁnd several results in our
regression analysis that are of the expected sign but are not statistically
signiﬁcant. In particular, we suspect that with a larger share of HSA
take-up we might be able to see more robust interaction effects in our
difference-in-differences analysis. However, we did ﬁnd some results
with statistical signiﬁcance suggesting some fairly strong sorting by
preferences of HSA takers.
The second limitation is that we do not know the wealth of the indi-
viduals or the composition of their assets. In addition, we do not know
whether some individuals do not invest because another family mem-
ber is investing. We tried to address this limitation somewhat by using
a difference-in-differences approach where each person’s wealth is pre-
sumed to be controlled due to the use of two years of data. We also as-
sume that wage income provides some proxy for wealth. However, a
more complete measure of assets would be beneﬁcial. In further exten-
sions of this research we hope to obtain asset information for the em-
ployees’deﬁned contribution retirement accounts.
Afurther extension of this research is to test the full conceptual model
after obtaining data on individual allocations of assets by different
classes of risk. We are working with two employers to provide the data
to test the remainder of the model using an approach similar to Gold-
man and Maestas (2005). There is precedent for this type of work from
Barber and Odean (2004) where the authors examined individual in-
vestment decisions based on information provided by a ﬁnancial ser-
vices ﬁrm. We would need a similar level of cooperation from ﬁnancial
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tors. Fortunately, these same ﬁrms are entering the HSA market and
may ﬁnd mutual beneﬁt from sharing data for an independent investi-
gation of this topic.
3.7 Conclusions
Using data from a large employer offering both a HSA beneﬁt and sup-
plemental retirement beneﬁts we ﬁnd evidence of joint and positive
propensities to invest in both assets. We also ﬁnd that income is large de-
terminant of HSA choice. In addition, we ﬁnd weak evidence that HSA
policy-holders are more likely to supplemental retirement assets. How-
ever, when we account for strong prior preferences for savings behavior
we ﬁnd that those investing in HSAs reduce their supplemental retire-
ment investment. However, this difference is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Although these results are preliminary they suggest that consumers are
making health and wealth decisions jointly, and that further research in
this area is warranted to assess the trade-offs between HSAs and per-
sonal investments.
Notes
1. See http:/ /content.members.ﬁdelity.com/Inside_Fidelity/fullStory/1,,6385,00.html
for more information on Fidelity’s health/wealth retirement product.
2. To the extent that almost everyone will be able to use them to pay their Medicare pre-
miums.
3. Henceforth, we will refer to the sum of all retirement plan contributions as 403(b).
4. A more detailed description of our methods is provided in Appendix B.
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Appendix A
Conceptual Model of Health and Wealth Joint Decisions
According to the theory of ﬁnance (Sharpe 1964), risk-averse investors
should invest their wealth in a risk-free asset (e.g., Treasury Bills) and 
a risky market portfolio in proportions that depend on the risk and 
return for these two assets. One could think of the investor as maxi-
mizing:
U   U( , R). (A1)
Where   return and R   risk. Prior to introducing HSAs the only as-
set is a market asset, so the investor’s budget constraint is:
    o    Rm (A2)
Rm market risk,  o return on risk-free asset and  is a constant return
per unit of risk.






2     . (A3)
The consumer may maximize utility at a corner solution where she
holds only Treasury Bills or only the risky market portfolio (M). It would
also be possible to borrow at the risk-free rate and invest in assets along
the extension of line  oM (see ﬁg. 3A.1).
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HSAs let investors hold their portfolio of choice in tax-free assets, but
HSAs also expose them to a new type of risk—person-speciﬁc health
risk, Rh. If market and health risks are uncorrelated, we can write total
risk as the sum of the two risks:
R   Rm   Rh (A4)
The return on the HSA is:
   








In equation (A5), t is the investor’s tax rate. A higher tax rate increases
the slope of the HSA return, so equation (A5) is steeper than equation
(A2) for any given  . HSAs create a kink in the budget constraint. To the
left of the kink, the after-tax market constraint applies; to the right, the
pretax HSA constraint applies (see ﬁg. 3A.2).
The decision to take an HSAis bound up with the decision to invest in
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Figure 3A.1 
Optimal portfolio allocation under riskrisky assets. Investor B is less risk averse than A, for example. Investor B
takes the HSA but A does not.
The location of the kink in the budget can be found by setting equa-
tion (A2) equal to equation (B5) and solving for R∗:
R∗   (A6)



























  0 (A7)
Holding preferences constant, an increase in the return on the risk-
free asset or the tax rate will reduce R∗, while an increase in the slope of
the market constraint or the investor’s health risk will increase it. Be-
cause a decrease (increase) in R∗ makes an HSAmore (less) attractive to
the investor, the demand for an HSA can be written as:
HSA   D[ o( ), t( ),  ( ), Rh( )] (A8)
The sign following each variable represents the expected sign for the co-
efﬁcient of that variable on the demand for an HSA.
 Rh   t o   
t 
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Figure 3A.2
HSAs create a kinked budget constraintNext, we want to explain how the investor divides his or her wealth
between the risk-free asset and the risky market portfolio. Holding pref-
erences constant, this will depend on factors that determine the slopes
of the budget constraints:
(1) An increase in the tax rate is relevant only if the consumer chooses
an HSA, but for these investors it increases the slope of the budget con-
straint—that is, ∂2 /∂t∂Rm    /(1 – t)2 0—which provides an incen-
tive to invest in risky assets.
(2) An increase in the return on the risk-free asset is a positive income
effect for all investors, but it does not affect the slope of the budget con-
straint. Therefore, it is not clear whether the optimal portfolio shifts
toward risky assets when  o increases.
(3) An increase in   makes the budget constraint steeper for both types
of investors, thereby increasing the attractiveness of risky assets.
(4) An increase in personal health risk is relevant only if the investor
chooses an HSA, in which case it has a negative income effect whose
sign is not certain.
If we let k represent the proportion of the portfolio invested in risky
assets, then from the previous factors we can write:
k⏐HSA   k[t( ),  o(?),  ( ), Rh(? but opposite to sign of µo)] (A9)
k⏐no HSA   k[t(0),  o(?),  ( ), Rh(0)] (A10)
The proportion of wealth held in risky assets should be different for in-
vestors who choose HSAs compared with those who do not, and two
variables—t and Rh—should matter only if an HSA is chosen.
Application of Theory to Health Savings Accounts and Supplemental
Retirement Decisions
Employees working in ﬁrms providing education, health care, and the
arts are eligible to contribute to a 404(b) supplemental retirement sav-
ings plan. Furthermore, since 1978 employees can contribute to Section
457 retirement savings plans. Both of these are tax-deferred retirement
savings programs. Unused, HSAs are yet another form of a tax-deferred
retirement savings program.
We assume there is a subset of employees who are maximum savers.
They wish to take full or signiﬁcant advantage of all tax-deferred sav-
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maxed-out her 403(b) contribution. When an HSA option becomes
available, she chooses it, while maintaining her 403(b). Addition of the
HSA option allows the person to increase her tax-free savings without
reducing her 403(b) contributions.
This behavior is illustrated in ﬁgure 3A.3. The x-intercept for the bud-
get constraint is after-tax income where Y income and t tax rate. The
budget constraint has a kink at the max 403(b). The person illustrated
has maxed-out her 403(b) contribution. Addition of the HSA option al-
lows the person to move away from the kink, increasing her tax-free sav-
ing without reducing her 403(b) contribution. Presumably, this person
can also add to her total savings opportunity by maxing out both her
403(b) and 457 opportunities.
Imagine another person who has not maxed out her 403(b). She might
still choose an HSA if she were very healthy because of the employer
contribution to the account. It has a good return and a low risk because
she does not expect to spend much on out-of-pocket medical care. In this
case, we would expect to see some cutback in the 403(b) contribution be-
cause the HSA is a better vehicle for tax-free savings.
In either scenario, it is reasonable to expect someone to invest in an
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Figure 3A.3
Joint choice of HSA and supplemental retirement contributionHSAas a supplemental retirement opportunity. An interesting question
is whether the person who does not typically max out their 403(b) con-
tribution, but chooses an HSA, operates as if she faces a budget con-
straint for retirement allocations and shifts resources from their previ-
ous levels of 403(b) contribution.
Appendix B
Econometric Analysis Approach
We estimate a bivariate probit model of two concurrent consumer deci-
sions: (1) election of an HSAhealth plan, and (2) the decision to enroll in
a supplemental retirement policy. The speciﬁcation of the bivariate pro-
bit permits us to see the different effects of employee characteristics as
well as the relatedness of these decisions. The joint probability that the
individual chooses an HSA and elects to participate in a supplemental
retirement plan is
Pr(e   1, y   1)   
∞
 Z  
∞
 X   
 (ε,  ,  )dεd 
   (X    , Z ;  ),
where  ( ) and  ( ) are the standardized bivariate normal density and
distribution functions (respectively) e is dummy variable determining
choices of a HSA, y is a dummy variable for the choice to invest in a
403(b) in 2006, Z is a vector of employee and plan characteristics deter-
mining e, X is a vector of employee characteristics determining y, and ε
is an error term that is distributed bivariate normally with a variance
normalized to one. This bivariate probit speciﬁcation estimates the ef-
fect of employee characteristics on the joint determination of HSA and
optional retirement program participation. The conditional probability
that the individual enrolls in an HSA, given that she also chose to con-
tribute to a 403(b) plan is
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Pr(e   1, y   1)
  
Pr(y   1)
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The model is identiﬁed (i.e., the estimates it provides will be unique) as
long as Z, the vector of explanatory variables in HSA choice equation,
contains at least one independent variable not in X, the vector in sup-
plemental retirement decision equation (O’Higgins 1994).
We also used a generalized linear regression model (GLM) to test
what factors were associated with the contribution to the supplemental
retirement program. For this part of the analysis we use a difference-in-
differences approach comparing the impact of pre and post HSA intro-
duction on retirement saving, speciﬁed as:
(403(b) investment⏐403(b) investment  0)  
BxXi   BHHSAi   BTTHSAi   ei,
where Xi represents a vector of person i variables inﬂuencing the op-
tional retirement contribution such as chronic illness, age, gender, fam-
ily status, and income; HSAiis an indicator for whether the person chose
an HSAin 2006; T is an indicator for 2006; and ei is a person-speciﬁc ran-
dom error term. The coefﬁcient BT represents the effect of the HSA on
supplemental retirement investment. These investment regressions ac-
count for repeated observations on individuals and tests of statistical
signiﬁcance are based robust standard error estimates.
We completed this analysis using two different approaches. First we
examined the impact of an HSAcohort variable (plus a time interaction)
on supplemental retirement investment. Second, we added the max
saver variable and fully inter-acted it with time and the HSA cohort to
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